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The Government's Role in the
"Purification" of Religious
Organizations
ROBERT L. TOMS*
LISA A. RUNQUIST**
The authors examine when governmental intervention into the affairs of
religious organizations may be permitted. Specifically, areas of the new
California nonprofit religious corporation law which may give rise to first
amendment challenges are considered. The discussion begins with an
analysis of problems in defining "religion" and 'religious activity" and
continues with a focus on the procedure for and result of a determination
that an organization is religious. As part of this discussion, the attorney
general's role in the affairs of the religious corporation is examined. The
specific areas examined are the state's role in 1) the examination of reli-
gious organizations for violations of the public trust; 2) the supervision of
the distribution of assets upon the dissolution of a religious corporation; 3)
the settlement of internal disputes regarding ownership of church property;
and 4) the regulation of secular activities engaged in by a religious organ-
ization. In conclusion, the authors anticipate that in attempting to define
and regulate religion, the new nonprofit corporation law may be heading
for a constitutional challenge depending on how the state decides to exer-
cise its power.
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On January first of this year, a new nonprofit corporation law
went into effect in California. This law, as a momentary glance
will disclose, is a complete renovation of the California nonprofit
corporation law. Although all of the repercussions stemming from
the changes will not be felt for some time, it is possible that some
constitutional challenges may be raised in the near future.
The area considered in this article is the right of the attorney
general and the state to exercise control over churches and other
religious organizations.' The purpose is to give an overview of
when, in light of federal constitutional restrictions limiting the
state's right of interference, government intervention into a reli-
gious organization may be appropriate. Because the new Califor-
nia nonprofit corporation laws have made definite changes in this
area, and because of the likelihood of resulting controversy, po-
tential consequences shall be considered.
The controversy which has arisen in regard to religious corpora-
tions stems from two different views of the relationship between
the church corporation and the state. One view holds the position
that the church, as a religious corporation, operates in a separate
sphere of sovereignty from the state and should be left to operate
in whatever manner it sees fit.2 The other view takes the position
that the church corporation is a ward of the state inasmuch as (1)
its very existence is a matter over which the state has control,
and (2) its funds are held in a public trust which must be en-
forced by the state if it appears that such public trust is being vio-
lated.3 The truth of the matter may lie somewhere between these
two positions, 4 because although the church is guaranteed certain
rights and immunities by the constitution which restricts the gov-
ernment's right to interfere with the church, the state government
1. Although the Internal Revenue Code has produced a controversy over the
legitimacy of a distinction between a "church" and a "religious organization," no
corresponding distinction has been raised in the new nonprofit corporation law.
Therefore, the terms "church," "religious corporation" and "religious organization"
shall be used interchangeably in this article.
2. This position is strongly supported by case law and by the United States
Constitution. The first amendment states in part that "Congress shall make no
law respecting the establishment of religion, nor prohibiting the free exercise
thereof."
3. According to a California deputy attorney general, speaking in the World
Wide Church of God case presently being litigated,
"It is Your Honor's responsibility, as we see it, to do whatever needs to
be done to appoint receivers and other agents to do whatever needs to be
done to ... protect the assets and records, and no one has any basis to
resist that intervention .... You [the Court] are the guardian and this
Church is Your ward."
Reporter's Transcript, January 10-12, at 9, 12.
4. "The Constitutional standard is the separation of Church and State. The
problem ... is one of degree." Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314 (1952).
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has a duty to protect its constituents. This holds true even where
an impropriety is ostensibly "religious."
I. THE DETERMINATION OF "RELIGION" OR "RELIGIOUS"
Many aggravated controversies in this area can be attributed to
a failure to define or agree upon common definitions of terms that
establish the premises for a thoughtful analysis. The definition of
what is "religion" or "religious" is not established. However, free-
dom of religion is a right guaranteed by the first amendment to
the United States Constitution. Further, the determination of
whether or not a corporation is a "religious" organization deter-
mines the law to be applied under the new nonprofit corporation
law.
The definition of the term "religion" has been a problematic is-
sue facing the courts for many years. The traditional definition of
religion commonly used in many decisions until the 1930's was
based on a theistic perception of religion. Malnak v. Yogi stated,
"Chief Justice Hughes, writing a dissent in 1931, could conclude
without concern that 'It]he essence of religion is belief in a rela-
tion to God involving duties superior to those arising from any
human relation.' "5 This definition is no longer satisfactory inas-
much as many religions, such as Hinduism, Buddhism, Transcen-
dental Meditation and Secular Humanism conceive of no "God" in
traditional sense. Even so, they should be subject to the same
limitations of the Establishment Clause as are Christianity and
Judaism.
The 1960's and early 1970's saw several "conscientious objector"
cases decided which gave the terms "religious training or belief" a
much broader definition. The resulting standard, according to
United States v. Seeger, is that the requisite beliefs be "sincere
religious beliefs which [are] based upon a power or being, or
upon a faith, to which all else is ultimately dependent." 6 Al-
though Justice Adams, in a concurring opinion in Malnak, finds
this standard to be too broad, the definition he proposes is not
much narrower. In defining Transcendental Meditation as a reli-
gion, he finds that "[i]t concerns itself with the same search for
ultimate truth as other religions and seeks to offer a comprehen-
sive and critically important answer to the questions and doubts
5. Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197, 201 (3rd Cir. 1979).
6. 380 U.S. 163, 176 (1965).
that haunt modern man."7
In addition to the problem of defining "religion" per se, another
problem that arises in attempting to define "religion" occurs in
determining the difference between "religious" and "secular" ac-
tivity. Is operating a radio or television station a religious activ-
ity? Is running a school or a hospital a religious activity? It is
obvious that each of these activities may occur in religious and
secular settings. If the only programs on the radio or television
station are religious, and the station's only purpose is to advance
the tenets of the particular faith, it will likely be found to be reli-
gious. Similarly, the Supreme Court has, in case after case, found
that church schools are unquestionably religious, and therefore
subject to the restrictions and protections of the first amend-
ment.8 However, the protections afforded under the first amend-
ment, may not extend to all activities engaged in by a religious
organization.9 Since "it is well established that a religious group
may not claim the protection of the first amendment with respect
to its purely secular activities,"'10 the findings of an activity to be
religious or secular may be determinative of how much control
the government may exercise in regulating the activity.
In analyzing the relevant cases, it appears that the determina-
tion of whether a corporate activity is religious is more dependent
upon the purpose of the corporation (as set forth in the articles of
incorporation) and its corresponding conduct, than upon the type
of activity." In other words, if the activities of an organization
can be shown to be for the purpose of advancing religion and the
conduct is found to correspond with this purpose, then the organi-
zation and activity will be entitled to a classification of "religious."
The question which remains, however, is whether the mere in-
quiry into the "religious" nature of a group or activity violates the
protections of the first amendment. A certain amount of such in-
quiry has been found to be permissible. As the Supreme Court
stated in Lemon v. Kurtzman:
Some relationship between government and religious organizations is in-
evitable. [citations deleted] Fire inspections, building and zoning regula-
tions, and state requirements under compulsory school-attendance laws
7. Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197, 214 (3rd Cir. 1979).
8. NLRB v. Catholic Bishop, 99 S. Ct. 1313 (1979); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S.
349 (1975); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S.
602 (1971).
9. See, e.g., Queen of Angels Hospital v. Younger, 66 Cal. App. 3d 359, 136 Cal.
Rptr. 36 (1977).
10. Id. at 370, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 42.
11. "[I1n some instances the 'character of the institution is to be determined
not alone by the powers of the corporation as defined in its charter, but also by the
manner of conducting' its activities." Lynch v. Spilman, 67 Cal. 2d 251, 264, 431 P.2d
636, 645, 62 Cal. Rptr. 12, 21 (1967).
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are examples of necessary and permissible contacts. Indeed, under the
statutory exemption before us in Walz, the State had a continuing burden
to ascertain that the exempt property was in fact being used for religious
worship.12
At the same time, this inquiry must be limited in scope. For ex-
ample, if the state presumes to determine what is or is not reli-
gious, it may have to examine the religious doctrines or beliefs of
the organization. The state is prohibited from doing this. In
Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral,13 the Supreme Court noted the
century-old recognition of "a spirit of freedom for religious organi-
zations, an independence from secular control or manipulation-
in short, a power to decide for themselves, free from state inter-
ference, matters of. . . faith and doctrine." Controversies over re-
ligious doctrine are to be determined by the religious
organization, rather than by the civil government. 14 Obviously,
the power to define "church" or "religion" is the power to limit re-
ligion and its expression. However, as the Supreme Court has
stated, "freedom of thought, which includes freedom of religious
beliefs, is basic in a society of free men. . . . Men may believe
what they cannot prove. They may not be put to proof of their re-
ligious doctrines or beliefs.15
In addition to the restrictions against examining religious doc-
trine, the government is prohibited from involving itself in any-
thing that would cause it to take anything other than a neutral
position in regard to religion. "The basic purpose of these provi-
sions . . . is to insure that no religion be sponsored or favored,
none commanded, and none inhibited."l6 A number of decisions
have held that a law that involves the government in a continuing
surveillance of a religious institution violates this neutrality.17 It
appears, therefore, that the government may be delving into con-
12. 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1970), citing Walz v. Tax Commission, 322 U.S. 78 (1943).
13. 344 U.S. 94, 116 (1952).
14. See, e.g., Presbyterian Church v. Hull Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969).
15. United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86 (1944) (citations omitted).
16. Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970).
17. In Walz, 397 U.S. at 674, the Supreme Court warned against governmental
involvements with churches which produce "a kind of continuing day-to-day rela-
tionship which the policy of neutrality seeks to minimize," and was very con-
cerned over the introduction of any "element of governmental evaluation and
standards." See also Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. at 615, 621 (prohibiting pro-
grams which entangle the state in details of administration), and Public Funds for
Public Schools of New Jersey v. Marburger, 358 F. Supp. 29, 36 (D.N.J. 1973) affid
mem., 417 U.S. 961 (1964) (barring relationships where the state and religious or-
ganization would "necessarily be involved in negotiations.").
stitutionally prohibited concerns when it attempts to define what
is religious. Indeed, a government that is capable of defining "re-
ligion" by executive fiat becomes an arbiter and teacher of faith,
mediating between God and man by separating the "valid" reli-
gion from the "invalid," on behalf of its constituents.18
II. ORGANIZATION OF THE NEW NONPROFIT CORPORATION LAW
The California legislature, recognizing the large diversity in
nonprofit corporations, has classified these corporations into three
types: Nonprofit public benefit corporations,19 nonprofit mutual
benefit corporations, 20 and nonprofit religious corporations.2 1 This
new legislation took effect on January 1, 1980.
Corporations formed under the new law will initially qualify as
religious corporations by complying with the organizational re-
quirements of the law. These requirements include a provision
mandating that the corporation's articles of incorporation include
a statement stipulating the religious purpose.22
For corporations already existing on January 1, 1980, the deter-
mination of whether they are subject to the new nonprofit reli-
gious corporation law is based on a transition provision which
provides that "any corporation organized primarily or exclusively
for religious purposes shall be subject to the new religious corpo-
ration law."23
Because the legislature recognized the special problems result-
ing from state interference with religious organizations, it made
the right of the attorney general to intervene in religious organi-
zations much more circumspect than his right to intervene in the
affairs of other nonprofit corporations. Therefore, the classifica-
18. The fact that we are guaranteed religious freedom by the U.S. Constitution
is of no consequence if that guarantee is not enforced. This fact is even more evi-
dent if we realize that the Constitution of the U.S.S.R., Article 52, also guarantees
"the right to profess or not to profess any religion, and to conduct religious wor-
ship or atheistic propaganda." Indeed, it is specifically stated that, "[in the
U.S.S.R., the church is separate from the state." Yet the reports of both Christians
and Jews from the Soviet Union tell an entirely different story in practice.
A good exposition of the type of inquisition that can develop if a government is
allowed to intrude in the area of defining "religious" is found in Of Tares and Here-
tics, LIBERTY, May-June 1979, at 23.
19. CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 5110-6910 (West Supp. 1979).
20. CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 7110-8910 (West Supp. 1979).
21. CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 9110-9690 (West Supp. 1979).
22. CAL. CORP. CODE § 9130(b) (West Supp. 1979) requires that each such cor-
poration include the following statement: '"This corporation is a religious corpora-
tion and is not organized for the private gain of any person. It is organized under
the Non-profit Religious Corporation Law (primarily or exclusively [insert one or
both]) for religious purposes." (The articles may include a further description of
the corporation's purposes.).
23. CAL. CORP. CODE § 9912 (West Supp. 1979).
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tion of a corporation as a religious corporation, for purposes of
falling within the scope of the new nonprofit religious corporation
law, is of primary importance.
As noted above, the determinative factor is whether the corpo-
ration is "primarily or exclusively religious." Prior to January 1,
1980, the Secretary of State's office was to have sent a "nonbind-
ing advisory notice to each corporation" subject to the old non-
profit corporation law, "indicating the type of corporation it is,
based on the rules set forth in subdivision (a) of this section."24
Because it is nonbinding, this notice apparently has no effect on
the ultimate determination of the type of corporation. However, it
is likely that unless the Secretary of State is willing to change its
determination or unless the organization petitions the superior
court for a determination of its status as provided by section
9912(d) of the new law, this notice will be used by the attorney
general and by other government officials, as a basis for their ac-
tions towards a corporation.25
A. Role of the Attorney General
Under the former nonprofit corporation law, the statute that
gave the attorney general supervision over nonprofit corporations
was applicable to all nonprofit corporations. 26 Therefore, there
was no requirement that the attorney general look at the religious
nature, as such, of the corporation. Under the new law, however,
the first instance in which the attorney general may examine a
corporation concerns whether it fails to qualify as a religious cor-
poration,27 in other words, whether it is primarily or exclusively
religious. If the attorney general determines that there is "rea-
sonable cause" to believe it is not religious, it may institute an ac-
tion "to establish that the corporation fails to qualify as a
religious corporation under this part, and if a court so finds it
shall enter an order that the corporation shall no longer operate
as a religious corporation under this part." 28
24. CAL. CORP. CODE § 9912(b) (West Supp. 1979).
25. The Attorney General is under no compulsion to follow the Secretary of
State's determination, and has indicated that he will decide for himself if a corpo-
ration is religous.
26. CAL. CORP. CODE § 9505 (West 1977) (repealed 1980).
27. CAL. CORP. CODE § 9230(a) (1) (West Supp. 1979). See also CAI. CORP.
CODE § 9912(d), where the attorney general must be notified of and may intervene
in a proceeding determining the nature of an organization.
28. CAI. CORP. CODE § 9230(d) (1) (West Supp. 1979).
There are two potential problems inherent in this law. The first
is whether the inquiry into the religious nature is a violation of
the first amendment. The second involves a conflict between the
corporation's stated purpose and the mandates of the law relating
to a corporation found not to be in compliance with the require-
ments for a religious corporation.
The problem of whether the attorney general, by inquiring into
the religious nature of an organization, has violated the first
amendment is dependent upon the scope of the inquiry made by
the attorney general. As we have noted, some inquiry is permissi-
ble. However, if the inquiry reaches a point where it begins to ex-
amine religious doctrine to determine whether the corporation is
genuinely religious, or if it develops into a continuing inquiry or
surveillance of the organization, it has gone beyond the constitu-
tional bounds.29
The second problem arises from the failure of a corporation to
"qualify" as a religious corporation. It is apparent that this quali-
fication is distinguished from compliance with the organizational
requirement that the articles of incorporation contain a statement
that the purpose is religious. Let us assume that a disqualified
corporation has stated in its articles that it is exclusively reli-
gious. As shall be seen, a corporation must be operated for the
purposes set forth in its articles. 30 Yet the new law could now re-
quire that this corporation not operate for the purposes set forth
in its articles, but rather for some other purpose-perhaps in the
manner in which it has been operating. This is not only contrary
to prior case law, 31 but, if followed by the disqualified corporation,
would operate to make the corporation liable for examination by
the attorney general for "substantial diversion of corporate assets
from stated corporate purposes." 32
B. The State's Rights and Responsibilities
Assuming the corporation is "religious," there are at least four
distinct situations that may trigger state involvement with such
organizations. First, if there is any indication of wrong-doing,
commission of a crime, or violation of the "public trust," the state,
if it finds a possible violation, will investigate and take whatever
steps are found necessary to preserve the assets of the organiza-
tion. Secondly, if a religious corporation is dissolved or its major
29. See text accompanying notes 12-18, supra.
30. See text accompanying notes 37, 44 and 45, infra.
31. See, e.g., Queen of Angels Hospital v. Younger, 66 Cal. App. 3d 359, 136 Cal.
Rptr. 36 (1977).
32. CAL. CORP. CODE § 9230(a) (5) (West Supp. 1979).
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assets disposed of, the state automatically becomes involved with
the distribution of assets. Third, if there is some dispute within
the church regarding property, the state may decide the matter of
its disposition. Finally, if the organization is engaged in some ac-
tivity licensed or otherwise regulated by the state, involvement
will occur.
In the first two cases involving the right of the state to intervene
when there is a dissolution of a religious corporation or when
there has been a violation of a law or of the public trust, state ac-
tion is supported by the new statute and by prior case law. In
these situations, the authority of the state is based upon its spe-
cial obligation to protect the public interest in situations where
there may be no individual capable of asserting such interest.33
In the last two situations, the right of the state to decide prop-
erty matters or to control certain activities stems from its general
police power to protect public health, safety and general welfare.
Although the question of the state's right to intervene in religious
affairs arises in both of these situations, these are matters dealing
with the state's general civil authority.
C. Violation of the Public Trust
It has long been recognized that the attorney general has a
right to institute actions where there has been mismanagement of
a public charity or trust. Over 80 years ago a California court
stated that:
It is not only the right, but the duty of the attorney general to prosecute
such an action. The state, as parens patriae, superintends the manage-
ment of all public charities or trusts, and, in these matters, acts through
her attorney general. . . . Such was the rule at common law, and it has
not been changed in this state.34
Scott had stated that:
In England the records show that even before the enactment of the Stat-
ute of Charitable Uses in 1601 suits were brought by the Attorney General
to enforce charitable trusts. The community has an interest in the en-
forcement of such trusts and the Attorney General represents the commu-
nity in seeing that the trusts are properly performed. 35
Up until January 1, 1980, the applicable statute read as follows:
A nonprofit corporation which holds property subject to any public or
charitable trust is subject at all times to examination by the Attorney
33. See Holt v. College of Osteopathic Physicians & Surgeons, 61 Cal. 2d 750,
754, 394 P.2d 932, 936, 40 Cal. Rptr. 244, 248 (1964).
34. People v. Cogswell, 113 Cal. 129, 136 (1896).
35. Scowt, TRUSTS § 391 (1939).
General, on behalf of the State, to ascertain the condition of its affairs and
to what extent, if at all, it may fail to comply with trusts which it has as-
sumed or may depart from the general purposes for which it is formed. In
case of any such failure or departure the Attorney General shall institute,
in the name of the State, the proceedings necessary to correct the non-
compliance or departure.
3 6
It is to be noted that this statute was applicable to all nonprofit
corporations holding property in trust, and was not limited simply
to religious organizations. In fact, it is not clear from this lan-
guage, or from the language in the above-cited cases, that the
power of the attorney general was applicable to religious organi-
zations at all. However, judicial interpretations have clearly indi-
cated that property held by a nonprofit or charitable corporation
is held in trust for the purposes for which the corporation was
formed. For instance, in Pacific Home v. County of Los Angeles,37
the court found that:
All the assets of a corporation organized solely for charitable purposes
must be deemed to be impressed with a charitable trust by virtue of the
express declaration of the corporation's purposes, and notwithstanding
the absence of any express declaration by those who contribute such as-
sets as to the purpose for which the contributions are made. In other
words, the acceptance of such assets under these circumstances estab-
lishes a charitable trust for the declared corporate purposes as effectively
as though the assets had been accepted from a donor who had expressly
provided in the instrument evidencing the gift that it was to be held in
trust solely for such charitable purposes.
Therefore, any property held by a corporation with charitable pur-
poses holds the property in trust.
Additionally, California cases have indicated that the definition
of "charitable" encompasses "religious." In Lynch v. Spilman,38
the court states that:
[A] charitable corporation is one created for or devoted to charitable pur-
poses. 'Charitable purposes include (a) the relief of poverty; (b) the ad-
vancement of education; (c) the advancement of religion; (d) the
promotion of health; (e) governmental or municipal purposes; (f) other
purposes the accomplishment of which is beneficial to the community'
.... As we said in another context. . . 'a bequest is charitable if (1) it is
made for a charitable purpose; its aims and accomplishments are of reli-
gious, educational, political or general social interest to mankind.3 9
Therefore, according to California case law, a nonprofit religious
corporation is charitable, and holds its assets in trust for the pur-
pose for which it is formed-and is therefore subject to regulation
by the attorney general under the general power of regulation
contained in section 9505 of the old nonprofit corporation law.
With the new law, specific instances have been enumerated de-
36. CAL. CORP. CODE § 9505 (West 1977) (repealed 1980).
37. 41 Cal. 2d 844, 852, 264 P.2d 539 (1953).
38. 67 Cal. 2d 251, 431 P.2d 636, 62 Cal. Rptr. 12 (1967).
39. Id. at 261, 431 P.2d at 642, 62 Cal. Rptr. at 18 (citations omitted, emphasis
added).
[Vol. 7: 355, 1980] Religious Non-Profit Organizations
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
noting when the attorney general may examine religious organi-
zations and institute an action for violation of the public trust:
(2) There is or has been any fraudulent activity in connection with the
corporation's property; or the general power of regulation
(3) Any corporate property is or has been improperly diverted for the per-
sonal benefit of any person; or
(4) Property solicited and received from the general public, based on a
representation that it would be used for a limited purpose other than gen-
eral support of the corporation's religious activities, has been improperly
used in a manner for which the property was solicited; or
(5) There has been a substantial diversion of corporate assets from stated
corporate purposes.
4 0
In all of these cases, there must first be reasonable grounds to be-
lieve that such condition or conditions have occurred or do exist.
This requirement of reasonableness is a necessary limitation, and
may prevent indiscriminate examination of religious organiza-
tions. In addition, the itemization of the specific situations that
must exist for the attorney general to intervene actually provide
more protection to the church than was provided by the old law.
There exists, however, a major constitutional problem which
might arise under this part of the new law. This is in regard to
the corporate purpose of the organization. The requirements of
the statute are basically simple-the corporate purpose must be
primarily or exclusively religious in order to be affected by this
statute. However, what the state views as "religious" and what
the organization views as "religious" may be widely disparate.
Again, if the state endeavors to determine whether religious pur-
poses are being carried out, it may encounter the first amendment
prohibition against examining religious doctrine. The United
States Supreme Court, in Cantwell v. State of Connecticut, indi-
cated that "to condition the solicitation of and for the perpetration
of religious views or systems upon a license, the grant of which
rests in the exercise of the determination by state authority as to
what is a religious cause, is to lay a forbidden burden upon the
exercise of liberty protected by the Constitution."4 1 Although
there may be many cases where an organization is clearly not us-
ing its assets as required by its articles, it is also probable that
there will be cases where the question of a violation of corporate
purpose hinges upon the particular definition of "religion" that
was being used.4 2
40. CAL. CORP. CODE § 9230(a) (West Supp. 1979).
41. 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
42. See text accompanying notes 5-17, supra.
The balance of section 9230(a), other than the inquiry into what
is "religious," is basically a codification of case law. It makes ex-
plicit what was originally implicit, and affirms the position already
taken by the California courts. So long as its use is limited to
where warranted, the rest of this section is unlikely to violate the
Constitution. However, if it is used unreasonably or if its effect
leads to continuing surveillances of religious organizations, the
result will be unconstitutional.
D. Dissolution of a Corporation
As in the case of a violation of the public trust, the state's right
to intervene in the dissolution of a corporation is supported both
by prior case law and by statute.43 The basic purpose of this ju-
risdiction is to ensure that the assets of the corporation are used
for the purposes for which the corporation was formed. As stated
by the court in Metropolitan Baptist Church of Richmond v.
Younger:
California has expressed a strong public policy that trust property of a
nonprofit religious or charitable corporation be not diverted from its de-
clared purpose. Ordinarily the Attorney General is charged with the re-
sponsibility of preventing such a departure. (Corp. Code Section 9505)
Special statutory precaution is taken that the trust's purpose will con-
tinue, as nearly as possible, even after the corporation's dissolution.4 4
The state's power in this area is limited to ensuring that the pur-
poses for which the corporation was formed are fulfilled. It can-
not take the funds and divert them to another purpose. The state
cannot, for example, take funds given to a religious corporation
and build a hospital any more than it can allow a corporation cre-
ated for the purposes of establishing and running a hospital to
discontinue operation in favor of operating another type of chari-
table organization. "The question is not whether Queen [of An-
gels Hospital] can use some of its assets or the proceeds from the
operation of the hospital for purposes other than running a hospi-
tal; it certainly can and has. The question is whether it can cease
to perform the primary purpose for which it was organized. That,
we believe, it cannot do."45
Under the old law, the assets of a charitable corporation would
be disposed of as directed by the superior court in an action in-
volving the attorney general.46 Since the statute itself did not pro-
43. CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 9800-9802 (repealed 1978); Cal. Corp. Code § 9680 (West
Supp. 1979); Metropolitan Baptist Church of Richmond v. Younger, 48 Cal. App. 3d
850, 121 Cal. Rptr. 899 (1975).
44. 48 Cal. App. 3d 850, 857, 121 Cal. Rptr. 899, 903 (1975).
45. Queen of Angels Hospital v. Younger, 66 Cal. App. 3d 359, 368, 136 Cal.
Rptr. 36, 41 (1977).
46. CAL. CORP. CODE § 9801 (West 1977) (repealed 1980).
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vide for the type of disposition to occur, assets were disposed of
in accordance with the case law above.
The new law provides that "[elxcept as provided in Section
6715, all of a corporation's assets shall be disposed of on dissolu-
tion in conformity with its articles or bylaws subject to complying
with the provisions of any trust under which such assets are
held."47 Thus, the requirement that the assets are disposed of in
accordance with the corporation's purposes has been incorpo-
rated in the statute.
Additionally, the new law has rendered the government's role
even more limited than before. If the attorney general waives, in
writing, any objections to the disposition, no superior decree is
necessary, although without such waiver a decree must be pro-
cured. Further, this decree may be granted upon petition by any
person concerned in the dissolution, after appropriate notice to
the attorney general,4 8 in contrast to the old statute, which re-
quired that the attorney general be a party to the proceedings.4 9
It is apparent, then, that the new nonprofit religious corporation
law has again incorporated the prior case law and has also pro-
vided a means by which dissolution need not involve the govern-
ment to any great degree, unless the attorney general deems such
involvement necessary. It is unlikely that any constitutional ob-
jection could be successfully raised against the government's role
in this area.
E. Property Determinations
Another situation where the government often finds itself in-
volved with church matters occurs following disputes within a
church, when it is called upon to determine ownership of church
property. Often, one or both sides to a dispute involving church
property resort to the civil courts to adjudicate the matter. Such
a dispute may be the result of simple dissension among members
of a church. Another situation which could become more com-
mon due to a recent Supreme Court decision, occurs when a
church which has been affiliated with a denomination, decides to
withdraw from that denomination and is faced with the subse-
47. CAL. CORP. CODE § 9680(e) (1) (West Supp. 1979).
48. CAL. CORP. CODE § 9680(e) (2) (West Supp. 1979).
49. CAL. CORP. CODE § 9801 (West 1977) (repealed 1980).
quent demand that the church property be relinquished. In both
cases, resort to the courts for resolution is possible.
Although there are few absolute rules in this area, certain
guidelines have been established by the United States Supreme
Court. The controlling principles in regard to state intervention
in a dispute over the rights to or disposition of certain church
property were set forth in Presbyterian Church v. Hull Church:
First Amendment values are plainly jeopardized when church property
litigation is made to turn on the resolution by civil courts of controversies
over religious doctrine and practice .... [T]he Amendment therefore
commands civil courts to decide church property disputes without resolv-
ing underlying controversies over religious doctrine.50
Thus, it was determined that the state may decide church prop-
erty disputes, only to the extent that it can do so without becom-
ing involved in disputes regarding religious doctrine. Whatever
approach the state uses is permissible "so long as it involves no
consideration of doctrinal matters, whether the ritual and liturgy
of worship or the tenents of faith."5l
In a recent 5-4 decision involving the disposition of church prop-
erty where a hierarchial church organization was involved, the
Supreme Court again emphasized that "the First Amendment
does not dictate that a State must follow a particular method of
resolving church property disputes." 5 2 The decision then pro-
ceeded to outline what it terms a "neutral principles approach"
for resolving such disputes. Rather than simply deferring to the
decision of an authoritative tribunal of the hierarchical church, it
requires the court to first examine "certain religious documents,
such as a church constitution, for language of trust in favor of the
general church."5 3 Therefore, there apparently must be a fairly
explicit statement of trust in the church documents, turning the
property or the disposition of the property over to the general or
"hierarchical" church, before the court will defer to a decision
rendered by such body. 4 Potentially, this may cause major
problems for some of the large denominational churches who, re-
lying on the old case of Watson v. Jones,5 5 never made their trusts
explicit, and who are now experiencing a weakening of denomina-
50. 393 U.S. 440, 449 (1969).
51. Maryland & Virginia Churches v. Sharpsburg Church, 396 U.S. 367, 368
(1970).
52. Jones v. Wolf, 99 S. Ct. 3020, 3025 (1979).
53. Id. at 3026.
54. Even before the decision in Jones v. Wolf, supra, was released, a Califor-
nia Court of Appeal came to a similar conclusion when it held that because the
local church had no notice or knowledge that an implied trust existed, no such im-
plied trust could be enforced. Presbytery of Riverside v. Community Church of
Palm Springs, 89 Cal. App. 3d 910, 152 Cal. Rptr. 854 (1979).
55. Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1872).
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tional ties. 56
As mentioned above, division within a church often occurs and
may sometimes stalemate any action being taken by the directors
of the church. If this endangers the corporate property, the new
code provides for a resolution of the problem through the use of a
neutral party:
a) Except as otherwise provided in the articles or bylaws, if the directors
are equally divided so that there is danger that the property of the corpo-
ration will be impaired or lost, the superior court of the proper county
may appoint a provisional director pursuant to this section. Action for
such appointment may be brought by any director or by members holding
not less than 33-1/2 percent of the voting power.
b) A provisional director shall be an impartial person. A provisional di-
rector shall have all the rights and powers of a director until such provi-
sional director is removed by order of the court or by approval of a
majority of all members (Section 5033). Such person shall be entitled to
such compensation as shall be fixed by the court unless otherwise agreed
with the corporation.
5 7
It must be noted that, although the attorney general or the court
cannot initiate an action, once an action is brought before the
court, a provisional director may be appointed to see that the as-
sets of the corporation are preserved. However, there are no
guidelines governing how the director is to decide what is to oc-
cur, and no limitations are placed on his power to act. Indeed, he
is expressly given all the rights and powers of a director. In other
words, unless the corporation has expressly provided otherwise,
the state can do indirectly (by appointing a director) what it can-
not do directly (decide points of doctrine). If this provision is put
into effect, it seems apparent that the requirements of the first
amendment have been violated, just as surely as if the state itself
entered into any decisions promulgated by the provisional direc-
tor. The requirement of the statute, that the provisional director
be "an impartial person," does not solve the problem because de-
cisions dealing with doctrine involve "taking a side," regardless of
how "impartial" one is. A provisional director appointed under
state action raises the spectre of establishment clause problems
through excessive entanglement.
F. Regulation of Secular Activities
"The First Amendment embraces two concepts, freedom to be-
lieve and freedom to act. The first is absolute but, in the nature of
56. See, e.g., THE PRESBYTERIAN LAvmAN, October/November 1979.
57. CAL. CORP. CODE § 9225 (West Supp. 1979).
things, the second cannot be. Conduct remains subject to regula-
tion for the protection of society."58
Cases challenging the right of the state to license or otherwise
control activities carried on by religious organizations have been
of two varieties. The first type involves the situation in which the
organization is engaged in "secular" activities. The second is
where the conduct engaged in involves a religious activity which
infringes upon rights of society.
The first variety may be illustrated by cases such as De La Salle
Institute v. United States,59 and Queen of Angels Hospital v.
Younger.60 In both of these cases it was held to be "well estab-
lished that a religious group may not claim the protection of the
First Amendment with respect to its purely secular activities."61
The first amendment is not brought into play simply because a re-
ligious group is involved. Rather, the "established rule (is) that
the application of neutral principles to situations not involving
the internal operations of a religious group infringes on no First
Amendment rights."62
This position seems to be uncontrovertible; laws regulating sec-
ular activities, promulgated for the good of the public, should be
applied uniformly. A difficulty arises, however, with the definition
of "secular" as opposed to "religious activities," both of which the
state and the religious organization define differently. The differ-
ences may arise even when both parties are acting in good faith.
The problem has most recently been seen in the attempts by
the government to require private religious schools, a number of
which are run directly by churches, to pay unemployment insur-
ance, although church employees are exempt according to stat-
ute.63 The rationale used is that such schools are not engaged in
a 'primarily religious activity,' and are thus subject to the same
regulations as secular schools. This contention is vigorously de-
nied by the churches and religious schools across the country,
and is presently being litigated in a number of forums.6 4
58. Cantwell v. Conn., 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940).
59. 195 F. Supp. 891 (N.D. Cal. 1961) (Christian Brothers Winery case).
60. 66 Cal. App. 3d 359, 136 Cal. Rptr. 36 (1977) (hospital run by a religious
group).
61. Id. at 370, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 42.
62. Id.
63. Federal Unemployment Tax Act, § 3309(b) (1) & (2), 26 U.S.C. § 3309(b) (1)
& (b) (2) (1977); CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE §§ 634.5, 2606 (West Supp. 1979).
64. A preliminary injunction was recently obtained against the State of Cali-
fornia in a case in the U.S. District Court, Central District of California, Grace
Brethren Church, et al. v. California, CV 79-0093 MKP (Kx). This rationale is also
contrary to Supreme Court decisions which have held private religious schools to
be so inherently religious as to be ineligible for state aid. See, e.g., Meek v. Pit-
tenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1970).
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In recognizing the growing trend of the government involve-
ment in this type of religious activity,65 an increasing number of
religious groups are becoming convinced that in order to maintain
control over their church and its religious activities, there must be
substantial resistance to any licensing or regulatory schemes
promulgated by any government organization. 66 In Ohio's Trojan
Horse,67 written about a case which concerns a church-school in
Ohio, it is stated that:
Christian schools everywhere must be, and hereby are, warned of the pit-
falls inherent in any system of state licensure or chartering that interferes
in the internal operation of church-schools .... Once the wall of separa-
tion has been breached it is extremely difficult-perhaps impossible-to
restore. Those Christians who willingly surrender their church-operated
schools to the control of the government should be advised to thoughtfully
consider the long-term results of their capitulation.68
This fear of state control is not without foundation. William B.
Ball, an eminent scholar and lawyer,69 expressed the reason for
this fear when he wrote:
Sometimes these regulations are common sensical, unpretentious and
worthwhile. But more and more we see the tendency in governmental
regulation to reach out to embrace every facet of the educational proc-
ess--even of the nontax-supported religious schools .... The multiple
"standards" are often "higher" in nothing but cost. The perfectionism of
bureaucrats appears at times as though designed to drive nontax-sup-
ported schools out of existence. 70
Therefore, the danger to religion may be present in the form of
the public servant with a well-designed plan to "protect" religion
and the state from insincere practitioners of religion. However,
the fact that the religious activity (e.g., school) may take place in
a secular context as well, does not do away with the freedom from
state domination and control guaranteed by the first amendment.
The second type of action by a religious group which could in-
voke state regulation occurs where the action, although religious
in nature, might, without regulation, infringe upon the rights of
others. A typical example of this is seen in solicitation cases,
65. See, e.g., NLRB v. Catholic Bishop, 99 S. Ct. 1313 (1979); Ohio v. Whisner,
47 Ohio St. 2d 181, 351 N.E. 2d 750 (1976).
66. Stang, The Government is Threatening Your Church, AMERICAN OPINION,
Jan. 1980.
67. A. GROVER, OHIO'S TRoJAN HORSE (1977).
68. Id. at 144.
69. Plaintiff's counsel in cases such as NLRB v. Catholic Bishop, 99 S. Ct. 1313
(1979); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Ohio v. Whisner, 47 Ohio St. 2d 181,
351 N.E.2d 750 (1976).
70. Pierce: The Dramatis Personae Live On, FREEDOM & EDUCATION: PIERCE V.
SOCIETY OF SISTERS RECONSIDERED, (1978).
where the government has attempted to regulate the solicitation
of the public by various charitable and religious groups. Some
such regulation is permissible:
It is equally clear that a state may by general and nondiscriminatory
legislation regulate the times, the places and the manner of soliciting
upon its streets, and of holding meetings thereon; and may in other re-
spects safeguard the peace, good order and comfort of the community
without unconstitutionally invading the liberties protected by the Four-
teenth Amendment. 71
While there is no absolute right to solicit, any denial of the right
to solicit must be based on adequate and nondiscriminatory
grounds, and must have a basis of promoting the public welfare:
Nothing we have said is intended even remotely to imply that, under the
cloak of religion, persons may, with impunity, commit frauds on the public
.... Without a doubt, a state may protect its citizens from fraudulent so-
licitation by requiring a stranger in the community, before permitting him
publicly to solicit funds for any purpose, to establish his identity and his
authority to act for the cause which he purports to represent.72
However, a regulation which gives a public official power to dis-
criminate, and thus to censor certain causes, is in violation of lib-
erties guaranteed by the first and fourteenth amendments. The
regulation will not be open to constitutional objection only if it
does not involve any religious test and is not unreasonable.
III. CONCLUSION
It appears that many constitutional problems inherent in the
new nonprofit corporations code stem from the government's at-
tempts to define religion, and from what may be overzealous at-
tempts to enforce the law without consideration of
constitutionally guaranteed religious liberties. It is forseeable
that the new nonprofit corporation law, although an improvement
over the old law in many ways, may encourage the overstepping
of constitutional bounds. Ultimately, the question of whether any
challenges to the law will be raised, will depend upon the extent
to which the state chooses to exercise its power, and whether its
officers remain mindful of the first amendment.
71. Cantwell v. Conn., 310 U.S. 296, 304 (1940).
72. Id. at 306.
